

No. 125483

In the
Supreme Court of Illinois

United States of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

Jeremy Glispie,
Defendant-Appellant.

On order agreeing to answer question certified by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
No. 19-1224

Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Jeremy Glispie

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Nature of the Case¹

Illinois' residential burglary statute prohibits an entry into the dwelling place of another when it is "without authority" and when the entrant intends to commit a felony or a theft within the dwelling place. 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a). It has been the law in Illinois for decades that, when an individual enters a building where he or she ostensibly has authority to be (such as a business building, another area open to the public, or even upon invitation into a home), such authority "extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open." *People v. Weaver*, 41 Ill. 2d 434, 439 (1968); *People v. Peeples*, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 487 (1993); see also *People v. Johnson*, 2019 IL 123318, ¶ 16 ("For over 100 years, Illinois case law has recognized that entering a retail store with the intent to commit a theft amounts to the crime of burglary."). This Court has applied this so-called "limited authority doctrine" explicitly to both simple burglary and home invasion, but has not explicitly decided whether this doctrine also applies to the identical "without authority" language used in the residential burglary statute. Compare *Johnson*, 2019 IL 123318 (reaffirming the limited authority doctrine as applied to the burglary

¹ The following abbreviations are used herein: record on appeal from the Central District of Illinois: "R. __ at __;" Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Record: "7th Cir. R. __ at __;" Appendix: "A__."

statute) and *Peeples*, 155 Ill. 2d at 487 (applying the doctrine to the Illinois home invasion statute) with *People v. Wilson*, 155 Ill. 2d 347, 382 (1993) (vacating the appellate court’s decision that held the limited authority doctrine did not apply to residential burglary where the trial court had “rejected testimony which would have made resort to the doctrine necessary”).

The certified question is whether, and to what extent, the limited authority doctrine applies to the residential burglary statute. Put another way, can the State prove residential burglary by showing that the defendant entered a residence with a concealed intent to commit a felony or theft even where the facts show that the owner allowed them to enter?

This question is relevant to Mr. Glispie’s federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm because he has several prior convictions for Illinois residential burglary. The underlying federal litigation is about the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”), a three-strikes sentence-enhancement statute that attaches to the crime of being a prohibited person (*e.g.* a felon) in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The ACCA covers anyone convicted under § 922(g) who has three prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses,” and the statute has a huge impact – it increases the potential

sentence from a *maximum* of 10 years' imprisonment to a *minimum* of 15 years' and a maximum of life. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

The Seventh Circuit has now recognized that, if the limited authority doctrine applies, Mr. Glispie's prior convictions for Illinois residential burglary do not count as predicate offenses for purposes of the ACCA, and he faces a maximum 10-year sentence. *United States v. Glispie*, 943 F.3d 358, 369 (7th Cir. 2019), A23. However, if the doctrine does not apply to residential burglary, he may be subject to the increased penalties under the ACCA. See *id.*

The answer is clear. The residential burglary statute, like the burglary and home invasion statutes, requires that an entry be "without authority." An entry is "without authority" for purposes of burglary and home invasion where the entrant has a criminal intent, even when he is invited into the space or otherwise has permission to be there, under the "limited authority doctrine." Because the language of the residential burglary statute is identical, it should have the same meaning. Accordingly, the limited authority doctrine must apply to residential burglary in the same way it applies to burglary and home invasion.

Issue Presented for Review

The question certified to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is, “whether, and if so under what circumstances, the limited-authority doctrine applies to [the Illinois] residential burglary statute, 720 ILCS 5/19-3.”

Standard of Review

Review of this question of law is *de novo*. *Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora*, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21.

Jurisdictional Statement

On November 19, 2019, the Seventh Circuit entered an order certifying a question of law to this Court. *United States v. Jeremy Glispie*, 943 F.3d 358, 372 (7th Cir. 2019), A1-A31. On November 26, 2019, this Court entered an order stating that it will answer the question. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 20.

Statutes Involved

720 ILCS 5/19-3. Residential burglary.

(a) A person commits residential burglary when he or she **knowingly and without authority enters or knowingly and without authority remains within the dwelling place of another, or any part thereof, with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft**. This offense includes the offense of burglary as defined in Section 19-1.

(a-5) A person commits residential burglary when he or she falsely

represents himself or herself, including but not limited to falsely representing himself or herself to be a representative of any unit of government or a construction, telecommunications, or utility company, for the purpose of gaining entry to the dwelling place of another, with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft or to facilitate the commission therein of a felony or theft by another.

(b) Sentence. Residential burglary is a Class 1 felony.

720 ILCS 5/19-1. Burglary.

(a) A person commits burglary when **without authority he or she knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building,** house trailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle, railroad car, or any part thereof, **with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft.** This offense shall not include the offenses set out in Section 4-102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(b) Sentence.

Burglary committed in, and without causing damage to, a watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle, railroad car, or any part thereof is a Class 3 felony. Burglary committed in a building, house trailer, or any part thereof or while causing damage to a watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle, railroad car, or any part thereof is a Class 2 felony. A burglary committed in a school, day care center, day care home, group day care home, or part day child care facility, or place of worship is a Class 1 felony, except that this provision does not apply to a day care center, day care home, group day care home, or part day child care facility operated in a private residence used as a dwelling.

(c) Regarding penalties prescribed in subsection (b) for violations committed in a day care center, day care home, group day care home, or part day child care facility, the time of day, time of year, and whether children under 18 years of age were present in the day care center, day care home, group day care home, or part day child care facility are irrelevant.

720 ILCS 5/19-6. Home Invasion.

(a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of duty

commits home invasion when **without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another** when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in the dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or who falsely represents himself or herself, including but not limited to, falsely representing himself or herself to be a representative of any unit of government or a construction, telecommunications, or utility company, for the purpose of gaining entry to the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons are present and

(1) While armed with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within the dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or

(2) Intentionally causes any injury, except as provided in subsection (a)(5), to any person or persons within the dwelling place, or

(3) While armed with a firearm uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within the dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or

(4) Uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within the dwelling place whether or not injury occurs and during the commission of the offense personally discharges a firearm, or

(5) Uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within the dwelling place whether or not injury occurs and during the commission of the offense personally discharges a firearm, or

(6) Commits, against any person or persons within that dwelling place, a violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, or 11-1.60 of this Code.

(b) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of home invasion that

the accused who knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in the dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present either immediately leaves the premises or surrenders to the person or persons lawfully present therein without either attempting to cause or causing serious bodily injury to any person present therein.

(c) Sentence. Home invasion in violation of subsection (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(6) is a Class X felony. A violation of subsection (a)(3) is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(4) is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(5) is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.

(d) For purposes of this Section, “dwelling place of another” includes a dwelling place where the defendant maintains a tenancy interest but from which the defendant has been barred by a divorce decree, judgment of dissolution of marriage, order of protection, or other court order.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Prohibited person in possession of a firearm.

It shall be unlawful for any person --

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

...

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Penalties for violating § 922(g).

Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6), (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).

(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g).

(2) As used in this subsection--

...

(B) **the term “violent felony” means** any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that--

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or

(ii) is **burglary**, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another; and

(C) the term “conviction” includes a finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.

Statement of Facts

Jeremy Glispie was convicted in federal court of being a felon in possession of a firearm. *United States v. Glispie*, 943 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 2019), A1. At the time he possessed the firearm, he had previously been convicted of residential burglary in Illinois for conduct that occurred in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2017.² R.35 at ¶¶ 40, 43, 45–47. He was sentenced to serve fifteen years' imprisonment on the new charge, based on the district court's determination that his prior convictions for Illinois residential burglary qualified him as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). *Glispie*, 943 F.3d at 359, A1–A2. The district court held that residential burglary in Illinois is no broader than generic burglary, based on Seventh Circuit precedent. *Id.* However, the Seventh Circuit has revisited this issue, and has concluded that the outcome of the federal litigation hinges on whether the limited authority doctrine applies to residential burglary. *Glispie*, 943 F.3d at 369, A23. This Court has accepted certification of this question. *Glispie*, 943 F.3d at 372, A30; 7th Cir. R.38.

² It is undisputed that Mr. Glispie's convictions arose under subsection (a) of the residential burglary statute. 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a). Mr. Glispie was convicted of residential burglary by entering in: St. Clair County Cases 11-CF-1910 and 11-CF-1911, and Tazewell County Cases 17-CF-208 and 17-CF-215. See records of these convictions, 7th Cir. R.23 at Gov. App. 1–16.

Argument

I. **The “limited authority” doctrine has been firmly established in Illinois law for decades.**

The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions for burglary by entering instruct a jury that a defendant’s entry into a building or other specified location “is ‘without authority’ if, at the time of the entry, the defendant has an intent to commit a criminal act within [that location,] regardless of whether the defendant was initially invited in or received consent to enter.” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.53(A) (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). This instruction is in line with a long line of cases in Illinois holding that “authority to enter a building for a specific lawful purpose is vitiated when a wrongdoer departs from that purpose and commits a felony or theft.” *People v. Wilson*, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 376 (1993).

A. **Application to simple burglary**

The Illinois burglary statute criminalizes an entry “without authority” into a number of locations including buildings and motor vehicles, “with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a). As early as the 1960s, this Court, while recognizing that “common-law breaking is no longer an essential element of the crime of burglary,” held that

authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open. An entry with intent to commit a theft cannot be said to be within the authority granted patrons of a laundromat.

People v. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d 434, 438–39 (1968) (internal citations omitted).

Based on this reasoning, the court upheld a conviction for burglary where the defendant stole money from a vending machine in a “well-lighted self-service laundromat,” rejecting his claim that, since the laundromat was open to the public at the time in question, he could have entered as a business invitee. *Id.* at 435, 438–39. In fact, the principle that “entering a retail store with the intent to commit a theft amounts to the crime of burglary” has been recognized for over a century by Illinois courts. *People v. Johnson*, 2019 IL 123318, ¶ 16 (collecting cases). As recently as this past August, this Court has reaffirmed that the limited authority doctrine continues to apply to the requirement in that an entry be “without authority” to constitute simple burglary. *Id.* ¶ 47.

B. Application to home invasion

A person commits home invasion when, “without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present” and commits any one of a number of other crimes. 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a). In a pair of cases

decided only eight months apart in 1993, this Court held that the limited authority doctrine applied to home invasion, in much the same way it applies to burglary.

In *People v. Peeples*, the Court considered a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for home invasion. 155 Ill. 2d 422, 486–88 (1993). Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court affirmed the conviction where the evidence suggested that “the defendant gained access to the victim’s apartment through trickery and deceit, under the pretense of borrowing a cup of sugar,” only to stab the victim once inside. *Id.* at 488. The Court recognized that “[t]he gravamen of the offense [of home invasion] is unauthorized entry.” *Id.* at 487. However, the Court held that “when a defendant comes to a private residence and is invited by the occupant, the authorization to enter is limited. Criminal actions exceed this limited authority.” *Id.*

In *People v. Bush*, the Court clarified that, where “the defendant gains access to the victim’s residence through trickery and deceit and with the intent to commit criminal acts,” his entry is without authority “because the true purpose for the entry exceeded the limited authorization granted.” 157 Ill. 2d 248, 254 (1993). However, where a defendant enters the premises

in question with an innocent intent, and only later engages in criminal actions, his entry is authorized. *Id.* The Court instructed that “an instruction regarding the limited authority doctrine is necessary to augment the IPI instructions on home invasion.” *Id.* at 257.

Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 11.53A was later adopted, consistent with the Court’s ruling in *Bush* and *Peeples*. The current version instructs:

The defendant’s entry into a dwelling of another is “without authority” if, at the time of entry into the dwelling, the defendant has an intent to commit a criminal act within the dwelling regardless of whether the defendant was initially invited into or received consent to enter the dwelling.

However, the defendant’s entry into the dwelling is “with authority” if the defendant enters the dwelling without criminal intent and was initially invited into or received consent to enter the dwelling, regardless of what the defendant does after he enters.

IPI Criminal 4th, No. 11.53(A).

II. The limited authority doctrine applies to residential burglary.

When courts interpret a statute, their primary goal is “to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” *In re Detention of Powell*, 217

Ill. 2d 123, 135 (2005). The natural starting place is the plain, ordinary meaning of the text of the statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. *Id.* Indeed, it is only where statutory language is

ambiguous that courts may consider other interpretive aids in resolving questions of legislative intent. *Id.*

A. The plain text of the residential burglary statute supports application of the limited authority doctrine.

In examining the text of the statute, the court “must consider the entire statute and interpret each of its relevant parts together.” *People v. Maggette*, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001). Where the same words appear in different parts of a statute, they are presumed to have a consistent meaning, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary. *Id.* at 349; *People v. Hudson*, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1044 (1983). This presumption of consistent usage is also appropriate where a legislature uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes; in such cases, courts should presume that “it means the same thing each time it is used.” *United States v. Castleman*, 572 U.S. 157, 174 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Relatedly, courts “assume[] that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. * * * Thus, they should all be construed together.” *Harvel v. City of Johnston City*, 146 Ill. 2d 277, 287 (1992) (quoting 2A N. Singer, *Sutherland on Statutory Construction* § 51.02, at 453 (Sands 4th ed. 1984)) (alteration in original). Moreover, “where a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts cannot read into the statute limitations,

exceptions, or other conditions not expressed by the legislature,” and should give “reasonable meaning to all words and sentences so that no part is rendered superfluous.” *People v. Glisson*, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 505 (2002).

In this case, the legislature used the same phrasing in the residential burglary statute that appeared in the burglary and home invasion statutes, two related statutes that pre-dated the enactment of the residential burglary statute. Compare 720 ILCS 5/19-3 with 720 ILCS 5/19-1 and 720 ILCS 5/19-6; see also *People v. Bales*, 108 Ill. 2d 182, 189, 193–94 (1985). The meaning of “without authority” in the simple burglary statute was well established by the time the legislature voted to add residential burglary in 1981. See, e.g., *Weaver*, 41 Ill. 2d at 438–39. And this Court has construed the language identically in the home invasion statute. *Peeples*, 155 Ill. 2d at 487; *Bush*, 157 Ill. 2d at 254.

Like the burglary and home invasion statutes, the residential burglary statute criminalizes an entry that is “without authority.” 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a). As explained *supra*, this language has a specific meaning in Illinois law, and extends to include situations where the entrant has permission but enters with an intent inconsistent with that permission. See *Wilson*, 155 Ill. 2d at 376. Since 2000, simple burglary has explicitly been a lesser-included offense of residential burglary. 2000 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A.

91-928 (West). To hold, as the United States advocates, that “without authority” requires something more or different in the context of the residential burglary statute than it does in the context of the simple burglary statute does not comport with the plain, unambiguous text of the statute, but would instead impermissibly “read into the statute limitations, exceptions, or other conditions not expressed by the legislature.” *Glisson*, 202 Ill. 2d at 505.

Rather, the plain meaning of “without authority” in the residential burglary statute should mirror its meaning in the simple burglary and home invasion statutes. In extending the limited authority doctrine to the home invasion statute, this Court cited the appellate court’s decision in *People v. Hudson* with approval. *Peeples*, 155 Ill. 2d at 487; *Bush*, 157 Ill. 2d at 254. In *Hudson*, the defendant asked the Appellate Court to vacate his home invasion conviction because the homeowner had let the defendant into his house, so his entry was not “without authority.” 113 Ill. App. at 1043. The court concluded that “‘without authority’ should mean the same under the burglary and home invasion statutes” and held that, where the defendant had been invited into the private residence but then exceeded the authority granted to him by binding and gagging his host, the entry

was “without authority.” *Id.* at 1045. Likewise, “without authority” should be given the same meaning in the residential burglary statute.

B. The legislative history of the residential burglary statute further suggests that the limited authority doctrine applies.

Even if the text of the statute were considered ambiguous, the legislative history supports reading “without authority” in the residential burglary statute consistently with its meaning in the burglary and home invasion statutes. Illinois first enacted a residential burglary statute in 1981, effective January 1, 1982, which substantially copied the burglary statute but limited the burglarized location to “the dwelling place of another” and classified the offense as a Class 1 felony, rather than the Class 2 designation given to simple burglary.³ Pub. Act 82-238 § 1, eff. Jan. 1,

³ Section 1 of Public Act 82-238 amended the simple burglary statute to read:
Sec. 19-1. Burglary.

(a) A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle as defined in The Illinois Vehicle Code, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft. This offense shall not include the offenses set out in Section 4-102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, *nor the offense of residential burglary as defined in Section 19-3 hereof.*

(b) Sentence. Burglary is a Class 2 felony.

Pub. Act 82-238 § 1, eff. Jan 1, 1982 (changes marked in italics). It also created the offense of Residential burglary, which was defined as follows:

Sec. 19-3

(a) Residential burglary. A person commits residential burglary who knowingly and without authority enters the dwelling place of another with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft.

1982. In enacting the statute, the legislature was reacting to a perceived “need to differentiate between nonresidential burglaries and burglaries of a home, where there is a substantial likelihood that people will be present,” and which typically involve greater threats to safety. John F. Decker and Christopher Kopacz, *Illinois Criminal Law: A Survey of Crimes and Defenses* § 13.05 (5th ed. 2017) (citing *People v. Walker*, 212 Ill. App. 3d 410, 413 (1991) and *People v. Gomez*, 120 Ill. App. 545, 549 (1983)). In *People v. Bales*, this Court noted that the legislature’s intent behind the enactment of the residential burglary statute was

to restore to this crime the original status of the crime of burglary – an offense against ... a structure or enclosure which is used for habitation purposes, and to make residential burglary a more serious offense than the ordinary illegal invasion of other types of structures or enclosures.

108 Ill. 2d at 191. The animating principle behind the enactment of the new statute was “to deter the unlawful entry into dwelling places and thus to protect the privacy and sanctity of the home.” *Id.* at 193 (citing Remarks at third reading of S.B. 0214, at 61, Pub. Act 82-238, June 17, 1981).

Id. (b) Sentence. Residential burglary is a Class 1 felony.

Consistent with this intent, at the time the residential burglary statute was enacted, it was “identical” to the simple burglary statute with only two exceptions:

(1) with residential burglary, the entry must have been into the dwelling place of another; and (2) ordinary burglary reached the defendant who entered without authority or without authority remained in the protected place, while the residential burglary statute reached only the defendant who enters.

Decker et al., § 13.05; see also *Bales*, 108 Ill. 2d at 189 (“[T]he distinguishing feature between burglary and residential burglary is that to constitute the latter offense the structure entered as described in section 19-3 must be ‘the dwelling place of another.’”).

The *Bales* court also noted that residential burglary fits somewhere between simple burglary and home invasion. Like the residential burglary statute, the home invasion statute “serves to deter the unlawful entry into dwelling places and to protect the sanctity of the home.” *Id.* at 193.

However, because home invasion has additional elements, including knowledge that people are present in the home and either the use or threatened use of force while armed with a dangerous weapon or intentional infliction of injury, “[h]ome invasion is a Class X felony and is much more limited in scope than is residential burglary.” *Bales*, 108 Ill. 2d at 193–94.

C. The Illinois Appellate Court applies the limited authority doctrine to subsection (a) of the residential burglary statute.

The plain text of the statute and the history of the legislation suggest that “without authority” has a single definition across all three statutes and, accordingly, that the limited authority doctrine applies to each statute in the same manner. Indeed, this is the conclusion the Illinois Appellate Court has reached. See *Decker et al.*, § 13.05. Before the enactment of the residential burglary statute, burglaries of residences were charged as simple burglary under Section 19-1. See, e.g., *People v. Fisher*, 83 Ill. App. 3d 619 (1980) (affirming a conviction for burglary of an apartment).

Under the simple burglary statute, the limited authority doctrine applied to residences. In *Fisher*, the First District reasoned that, although the defendants were invited into the apartment for a social visit, “it cannot be said that their entry was authorized by the occupants for the concealed criminal purpose for which they actually came,” and found that the logic of *Weaver* and others applying the limited authority doctrine to public buildings was “equally applicable” to private residences. 83 Ill. App. 3d at 622–23 (citing *Weaver*, 41 Ill. 2d 434; *People v. Schneller*, 69 Ill. App. 2d 50 (1966); and *People v. Blair*, 52 Ill. 2d 371 (1972)); see also *People v. Racanelli*, 132 Ill. App. 3d 124, 134 (1985) (affirming a conviction for the burglary of a residence and home invasion that occurred in 1981, predicated on a single

unauthorized entry where the defendants entered with the victim's authority, but "exceeded that authority when they attacked the victim and removed his property").

The Third District explicitly applied this reasoning to the residential burglary statute as early as 1989, citing to *Fisher* and *Hudson*. In *People v. Walker*, the court affirmed a conviction for residential burglary where the victim had permitted the defendants to enter the home to use the telephone, reasoning that, "[o]nce one of the men attacked him and took his money from his person and his home, that authorization ended." 191 Ill. App. 3d at 387. In *People v. Scott*, the Third District relied on this Court's holding in *Bush* and the rule announced for home invasion to interpret the residential burglary statute. 337 Ill. App. 3d 951, 956-57 (2003). The *Scott* court affirmed a conviction for residential burglary where the victim allowed the defendant to enter his home, with the belief that they were going to play chess, and where there was evidence that the defendant intended to rob the victim at the time he entered the apartment. *Id.* at 957-58.

Though the Fourth and Fifth Districts do not seem to have had occasion to address the limited authority doctrine particularly in relationship to the residential burglary statute, the Fifth District has

recognized that the doctrine applies to private, as well as public, spaces in both the simple burglary and home invasion contexts. See *People v. Bailey*, 188 Ill. App. 3d 278, 285–87 (1989) (citing *Hudson*, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1041) (“The so-called ‘limited authority’ doctrine has been extended to include the burglary of a private residence as well [as public buildings].... For purposes of the application of this doctrine to the burglary statute, we can make no meaningful distinction between a private residence and a motor vehicle.”).

It is only the Second District that, at one point, rejected the limited authority doctrine as applied to private spaces. *People v. Helper*, 132 Ill. App. 3d 705, 711 (1985) (vacating a conviction for residential burglary for insufficient evidence of an entry “without authority,” and holding that it was not sufficient to show that the defendant entered the victim’s house with the intent to steal something inside); see also *People v. Peace*, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1093 (1980) (vacating a conviction for simple burglary where the defendant had permission to enter the home to use the phone but attacked the victim once inside); *People v. Baker*, 59 Ill. App. 3d 100, 102–03 (1978) (declining to apply the limited authority doctrine to a private parking garage). The refusal to extend the doctrine to private spaces, however, has since been abrogated by this Court’s decision in *Peeples*, a

fact that the Second District has recognized. *People v. Dillavou*, 2011 IL App. 091194, ¶ 18 (citing *Peeples*, 155 Ill. 2d at 487–88) (noting that, if the State proves a defendant had the intent to commit a theft before entering the victim’s home, it satisfies the “without authority” element of residential burglary-by-entry).

Recognizing that the doctrine does not distinguish between public and private spaces, the Illinois Appellate Court has thus applied the limited authority doctrine to residences for purposes of both home invasion and residential burglary convictions. This consensus is reflected in the Illinois pattern jury instructions. See IPI Criminal 4th, No. 11.53(A) (“Unauthorized Entry – Limited Authority Doctrine – Home Invasion And Residential Burglary”). Nothing in the statutory text, the legislative history, nor this Court’s case law suggests that the limited authority doctrine applies to burglary and home invasion, but not to residential burglary.

III. The 2010 addition of Subsection (a-5) to the residential burglary statute does not indicate a legislative intent to abrogate the limited authority doctrine with respect to residential burglaries charged under Subsection (a).

In 2010, the Illinois legislature added subsection (a-5) to the residential burglary statute. 2010 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 96-1113 (West).

When this legislation was passed, *Peeples* and *Bush* were almost 20 years

old. It was, therefore, firmly established that the limited authority doctrine applied to residences as well as buildings open to the public. *Peeples*, 155 Ill. 2d at 487–88; *Bush*, 157 Ill. 2d at 254. The United States argued before the Seventh Circuit that the addition of subsection (a-5), which relates to burglary by false representation, demonstrates that subsection (a) requires something other than entry with contemporaneous intent to commit a crime. 7th Cir. R.23 at 29–32. The same legislation added similar provisions to the home invasion statute, however, despite clear authority from this Court that the statute was subject to the limited authority doctrine. 2010 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 96-1113; *Peeples*, 155 Ill. 2d at 487–88; *Bush*, 157 Ill. 2d at 254.

The addition of unrelated language does not change the existing body of law on the limited authority doctrine, and no Illinois case has reinterpreted the doctrine’s application to subsection (a) based on this amendment. This Court presumes that “the legislature has acquiesced in the court’s construction of the statute and the declaration of legislative intent” when it declines to amend a statute following that interpretation. *Johnson*, 2019 IL 123318, ¶ 14. As explained *supra*, Illinois courts applied the limited authority doctrine’s principles to burglaries of residences at least as far back as 1980, 30 years before the legislature added subsection (a-5).

See, e.g., *Fisher*, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 622–23. Just as the addition of statutory language criminalizing retail theft did not change the existing law on burglary from a retail establishment, neither did the addition of a residential burglary by fraud change the existing law on residential burglary by unauthorized entry. See *Johnson*, 2019 IL 123318 at ¶¶ 31–35.

Moreover, applying the limited authority doctrine to the “without authority” requirement in subsection (a) does not render subsection (a-5) superfluous. Indeed, the plain text of subsection (a-5) expressly extends liability for burglary to the act of “casing” a home for later crimes. 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a-5) (expressly including an intent “to facilitate the commission [in the dwelling place of another] of a felony or theft by another”).

IV. The certified question should be answered in the affirmative.

A criminal defendant charged in federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm is subject to a sentence of imprisonment of between zero and ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a). However, if that defendant has three prior convictions for either violent felonies or serious drug offenses, the penalty range jumps to fifteen years’ to life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). When determining whether a prior conviction fits the definition of “violent felony” or “serious drug offense,” federal courts may not

consider what the defendant actually did; instead, they may only consider the elements of the statutory offense of conviction. *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990). These definitions are the subject, therefore, of substantial litigation.

Under federal law, a prior burglary conviction only counts as a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA if the statute of conviction requires proof of the following elements: “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining within, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” *Id.* at 598. This has come to be known as “generic burglary.” *Id.* In *Descamps v. United States*, the Supreme Court considered California’s burglary statute, which prohibited the entry of certain locations “with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” 570 U.S. 254, 258–59 (2013); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 459 (West 2010). Because the statute did not require an unlawful entry, along the lines of breaking and entering, the Court concluded that it was broader than generic burglary and could not serve as an ACCA predicate offense. *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 259, 264–65.

Similarly, if the limited authority doctrine applies to Illinois residential burglary, convictions under this statute will not qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA, and Mr. Glispie’s sentence will be

reduced from fifteen years' imprisonment to a maximum of ten. *Glispie*, 943 F.3d at 369, A23. However, if Congress's intent is to punish offenders like Mr. Glispie more severely, the answer is to amend the ACCA, not to depart from long-standing state law. Indeed, a ruling in this case that the limited authority doctrine does not apply to the residential burglary statute would undermine the finality and consistency of Illinois law recently affirmed in *Johnson* and routinely employed in residential burglary situations. See *Johnson*, 2019 IL 123318; IPI Criminal 4th, No. 11.53(A).

For these reasons, the Court should hold that, under 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a), a defendant's entry into the dwelling of another is "without authority" when "the defendant has an intent to commit a criminal act with the dwelling regardless of whether the defendant was initially invited into or received consent to enter the dwelling." IPI Criminal 4th, No. 11.53(A).

Conclusion

For these reasons, Defendant-Appellant Jeremy Glispie respectfully requests that this Court hold that the limited authority doctrine applies to subsection (a) of the Illinois residential burglary statute consistent such that one may be convicted of residential burglary upon a showing that they entered a residence with a concealed intent to commit a felony or theft even when the owner allowed them to enter and so answer the certified question from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Colleen M. Ramais

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Certificate of compliance with Ill. S. Ct. R. 341

I certify that this brief conforms with the requirements of Rules 341(a) and (b). The length of this brief, excluding the pages or words contained in the Rule 341(d) cover, the Rule 341(h)(1) statement of points and authorities, the Rule 341(c) certificate of compliance, the certificate of service, and those matters to be appended to the brief under Rule 342(a), is 6,709 words.

s/ Colleen M. Ramais
Colleen M. Ramais
Assistant Federal Public Defender

Dated: January 30, 2020

No. 125483

In the
Supreme Court of Illinois

United States of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

Jeremy Glispie,
Defendant-Appellant.

On order agreeing to answer question certified by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
No. 19-1224

Rule 342 appendix of
Defendant-Appellant, Jeremy Glispie

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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19-1224

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JEREMY GLISPIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:18-cr-10002-JES-JEH-1 — **James E. Shadid**, *Judge*.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 2019

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, *Circuit Judges*.

RIPPLE, *Circuit Judge*. On January 23, 2018, the Government filed a single-count indictment against Jeremy Glispie for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Mr. Glispie entered a plea of guilty, but reserved the right to challenge his anticipated designation as an armed career criminal based on his prior convictions for residential burglary under Illinois law. Following our guidance, the district court concluded that residential burglary in

Illinois is no broader than “generic burglary” and that it therefore qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Consequently, it sentenced Mr. Glispie as an armed career criminal and imposed a sentence of 180 months.

Before this court, Mr. Glispie renews his objection to his designation as an armed career criminal based on his convictions for residential burglary under Illinois law. Acknowledging that our decision in *Dawkins v. United States*, 809 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016), is controlling, he urges us to revisit that decision. According to Mr. Glispie, *Dawkins* did not explore all of the relevant aspects of Illinois burglary. Had we fully considered the question, he submits, we would have reached the conclusion that residential burglary in Illinois covers a broader swath of conduct than generic burglary for purposes of the ACCA and, therefore, cannot be used as a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA.

After considering the briefs and hearing oral argument, we conclude that Mr. Glispie has raised an important issue that has not been considered fully: whether the limited-authority doctrine applies to the Illinois residential burglary statute. As we will explain, if the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary, then a conviction for Illinois residential burglary is broader than generic burglary and cannot qualify as an aggravated felony for purposes of the ACCA. If, however, the limited-authority doctrine does not apply to Illinois residential burglary, then a conviction under that statute is no broader than generic burglary and qualifies as an aggravated felony. Because the Supreme Court of Illinois has not made this determination, and because the question is likely to arise frequently and to affect

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the administration of justice in both the state and federal courts, we respectfully seek the assistance of the Supreme Court of Illinois by certifying this controlling question of law.¹

I.

Whether Mr. Glispie's convictions qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA requires us to look at the elements of generic burglary under the ACCA as well as the elements of residential burglary under Illinois law. We turn first to the ACCA, then to Illinois law, and finally to our cases that have addressed the intersection of the two.

A. Generic Burglary under the ACCA

The ACCA "increases the sentences of certain federal defendants who have three prior convictions 'for a violent felony.'" *Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). For purposes of the ACCA, a violent felony is 1) a crime that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" or 2) "burglary, arson, ... extortion, [or] involves the use of explosives." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).²

¹ Because our decision calls into question our decision in *Dawkins v. United States*, 809 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016), we have circulated it to all judges in active service in accordance with Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge in active service requested to hear this case en banc.

² Prior to *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), if a defendant's conviction was not one of the enumerated offenses, it still might have qualified as a violent felony if it "involve[d] conduct that present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C.

(continued ...)

To determine whether a past conviction qualifies as one of the enumerated offenses, courts employ the categorical approach:

They compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant's conviction with the elements of the "generic" crime—*i.e.*, the offense as commonly understood. The prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if the statute's elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.

Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257.

The Supreme Court has addressed the definition of generic burglary under the ACCA on several occasions. In *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990), the Court held, for the first time, that burglary as set forth in § 924(e)(2)(B) meant "'burglary' [in] the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States." The Court further explained that, "[a]lthough the exact formulations vary, the generic, contemporary meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime." *Id.* The Court then turned to "the problem of applying this conclusion to cases in which the state statute under which a defendant is convicted varies from the generic definition of 'burglary.'" *Id.* at 599. It concluded that "the only plausible interpretation of

(... continued)

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). However, *Johnson* held that this "residual" clause of § 924(e)(2)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2563.

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§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is that, like the rest of the enhancement statute, it generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” *Id.* at 602. If the statutory definition of the prior crime of conviction is narrower than generic burglary, or has “minor variations in terminology,” *id.* at 599, it qualifies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) as a violent felony. If the definition in the state statute is broader than generic burglary, for instance, “by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful, or by including places, such as automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings,” a conviction under that statute would not qualify as a predicate under the ACCA. *Id.* This process of comparing the elements of the generic crime to those set forth in the state statute of conviction has come to be known as the “categorical approach.”

The Court also spoke directly to the requirements of generic burglary in *Descamps*. The precise issue before the Court in *Descamps* focused on what legal authorities and record documents may be used to determine whether an offense qualifies as one of the enumerated generic offenses under the ACCA. Specifically, the Court addressed whether a sentencing court may “decide, based on information about a case’s underlying facts, that the defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate even though the elements of the crime fail to satisfy our categorical test.” *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 258. In *Descamps*, the Government had asked the district court to impose an enhanced sentence under the ACCA based in part on the defendant’s conviction

for burglary under California law.³ The law “provides that a ‘person who enters’ certain locations ‘with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.’” *Id.* at 258–59. The Court noted that the “statute does not require the entry to have been unlawful in the way most burglary laws do. Whereas burglary statutes generally demand breaking and entering or similar conduct, California’s does not: It covers, for example, a shoplifter who enters a store, like any customer, during normal business hours.” *Id.* at 259. “In sweeping so widely,” the Court continued, “the state law goes beyond the normal, ‘generic’ definition of burglary.” *Id.* At the trial level, Descamps had argued that this “asymmetry of offense elements precluded his conviction ... from serving as an ACCA predicate, whether or not his own burglary involved an unlawful entry that could have satisfied the requirements of the generic crime.” *Id.* The district court, however, had disagreed. Looking beyond the statutory elements of the offense to Descamps’s actual conduct, the district court concluded that Descamps’s conduct satisfied the generic definition of burglary for purposes of the ACCA.

The Supreme Court, however, held that the district court had erred in deviating from the categorical approach. The Court explained that the “modified categorical approach” employed by the district court “helps implement the categorical approach when a defendant [has been] convicted of violating a divisible statute.” *Id.* at 263. If the statute is not divisible—does not “comprise[] multiple, alternative ver-

³ The law at issue was section 459 of the California Penal Code Annotated.

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sions of the crime”—the modified categorical approach simply does not apply. *Id.* at 262–64. The Court therefore concluded that, in Descamps’s case, the modified approach had no role to play because “[t]he dispute here does not concern any list of alternative elements. Rather,” the Court continued,

it involves a simple discrepancy between generic burglary and the crime established in § 459. The former requires an unlawful entry along the lines of breaking and entering. The latter does not, and indeed covers simple shoplifting In *Taylor’s* words, then, § 459 “define[s] burglary more broadly” than the generic offense. And because that is true—because California, to get a conviction, need not prove that Descamps broke and entered—a § 459 violation cannot serve as an ACCA predicate. Whether Descamps *did* break and enter makes no difference. And likewise, whether he ever admitted to breaking and entering is irrelevant. ... We know Descamps’ crime of conviction, and it does not correspond to the relevant generic offense. Under our prior decisions, the inquiry is over.

Id. at 264–65 (citations and parallel citations omitted); *see also Mathis v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016) (observing that, in *Descamps*, it had “found that a California statute swept more broadly than generic burglary because it criminalized entering a location (even if lawfully) with the intent to steal, and thus encompassed mere shoplifting”).

Following *Descamps*, the Court twice has addressed the elements of generic burglary. In *United States v. Stitt*, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018), the Court considered “whether the statutory term ‘burglary’ includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.” *Id.* at 403–04. The Court held that it does. The Court noted that it had been “clear in *Taylor* that Congress intended the definition of ‘burglary’ to reflect ‘the generic sense in which the term [was] used in the criminal codes of most States’ at the time the Act was passed.” *Id.* at 406 (quoting *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 598). At that time, “a majority of state burglary statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used for lodging—either explicitly or by defining ‘building’ or ‘structure’ to include those vehicles.” *Id.* Additionally, Congress

viewed burglary as an inherently dangerous crime because burglary “creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to investigate.” An offender who breaks into a mobile home, an RV, a camping tent, a vehicle, or another structure that is adapted for or customarily used for lodging runs a similar or greater risk of violent confrontation.

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 588). The second case, *Quarles v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019), decided just last term, addressed “[t]he exceedingly narrow question”

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whether remaining-in burglary⁴ (i) occurs only if a person has the intent to commit a crime *at the exact moment* when he or she *first* unlawfully remains in a building or structure, or (ii) more broadly, occurs when a person forms the intent to commit a crime *at any time* while unlawfully remaining in a building or structure.

Id. at 1875. The Court concluded it was the latter. Moving from general to specific, the Court “sum[med] up” its holding accordingly:

The Armed Career Criminal Act does not define the term “burglary.” In *Taylor*, the Court explained that “Congress did not wish to specify an exact formulation that an offense must meet in order to count as ‘burglary’ for enhancement purposes.” And the Court *recog-*

⁴ In *Quarles v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019), the Court explained the origin of “remaining-in” burglary. “At common law,” it noted, “burglary was confined to unlawful breaking and entering a dwelling at night with the intent to commit a felony. But by the time Congress passed ... the current version of § 924(e) in 1986, state burglary statutes had long since departed from the common-law formulation.” *Id.* at 1876–77. By that time, States not only had “cast[] off relics like the requirement that there be a breaking, or that the unlawful entry occur at night,” but a majority of States also “prohibited unlawfully ‘remaining in’ a building or structure with intent to commit a crime. Those remaining-in statutes closed a loophole in some States’ laws by extending burglary to cover situations where a person enters a structure lawfully but stays unlawfully—for example, by remaining in a store after closing time without permission to do so.” *Id.* at 1877; *see also infra* note 12 (discussing interpretation of “remaining-in” burglary under Illinois law).

nized that the definitions of burglary “vary” among the States. The *Taylor* Court therefore interpreted the generic term “burglary” in § 924(e) in light of: the ordinary understanding of burglary as of 1986; the States’ laws at that time; Congress’ recognition of the dangers of burglary; and Congress’ stated objective of imposing increased punishment on armed career criminals who had committed prior burglaries. Looking at those sources, the *Taylor* Court interpreted generic burglary under § 924(e) to encompass remaining-in burglary. Looking at those same sources, we interpret remaining-in burglary under § 924(e) to occur when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully present in a building or structure.

Id. at 1879 (quoting *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 599, 598).

Drawing from these cases, generic burglary requires “at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 598. “[O]ther structure[s]” include a vehicle “that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.” *Stitt*, 139 S. Ct. at 403–04. Regardless of the type of structure, however, the entry itself must be unlawful; an intent to later commit a crime or theft, without more, does not

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meet this requirement. *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 264–65; *Mathis*, 136 S. Ct. at 2248–49.⁵

B. Illinois Residential Burglary

The next step in the categorical approach requires us to determine the elements of residential burglary under Illinois law. Mr. Glispie asserts that, unlike generic burglary, Illinois residential burglary “does not require an unlawful or unauthorized entry, separate and apart from an entry or remaining with intent to commit a crime.”⁶ To determine the scope of the Illinois residential burglary statute, we look to the language of the statute as it has been interpreted by the Illinois courts. *See Mathis v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (stating that the “threshold inquiry” whether listed items in a criminal statute are “elements or means” had been settled by a decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, and, “[w]hen a ruling of that kind exists, a sentencing judge need only follow what

⁵ *See also United States v. Mungro*, 754 F.3d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 2014) (observing that, if North Carolina’s law prohibiting “breaking or entering” “cover[ed] any entry into the building with the intent to commit a crime, even when a person enters with the building owner’s consent,” then this might “disqualify it as a predicate offense because ‘generic burglary’s unlawful-entry element excludes any case in which a person enters premises open to the public, no matter his intent’” (quoting *Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254, 275 (2013)); *United States v. Hiser*, 532 F. App’x 648, 648 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the defendant’s two prior convictions for burglary under Nevada law did not qualify as generic burglaries because “Nevada’s burglary statute is facially broader than the generic definition of burglary because it ‘does not require the entry to have been unlawful in the way most burglary laws do’” (quoting *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 259)).

⁶ Appellant’s Br. 16.

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it says"); *Smith v. United States*, 877 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2017) (relying on a decision of the Illinois Appellate Court to conclude that the definition of dwelling under the Illinois residential burglary statute excludes vehicles other than occupied trailers and therefore is not broader than generic burglary).⁷

⁷ We note that, in *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 275, the Court "reserve[d] the question whether, in determining a crime's elements, a sentencing court should take account not only of the relevant statute's text, but of judicial rulings interpreting it." However, the Supreme Court has relied explicitly on statutory interpretations by state supreme courts in applying the categorical and modified categorical approaches. See *Mathis v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016); *Johnson v. United States*, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010) (stating that the Court was "bound by the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements" of Florida battery in assessing whether a conviction under that statute "meets the definition of 'violent felony' in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)"). Additionally, it has been the regular practice of this court, as well as other Courts of Appeals, to rely on state courts' interpretations of statutes in addressing questions of the breadth of state law. See, e.g., *Smith v. United States*, 877 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2017); *United States v. Aparicio-Soria*, 740 F.3d 152, 154 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) ("To the extent that the statutory definition of the prior offense has been interpreted by the state's highest court, that interpretation constrains our analysis of the elements of state law." (citing *Johnson*, 559 U.S. at 138)); *United States v. Tighe*, 266 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that "[a] state court's interpretation of a statute is binding in determining whether the elements of generic burglary are present" and adhering to a decision of the Supreme Court of South Dakota defining the elements of burglary under the state statute).

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The Illinois residential burglary statute⁸ provides, in relevant part:

A person commits residential burglary when he or she knowingly and without authority enters or knowingly and without authority remains within the dwelling place of another, or any part thereof, with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft. This offense includes the offense of burglary as defined in Section 19-1.

720 ILCS 5/19-3(a). Mr. Glispie admits that, “[o]n its face, the statute appears to require not only that the State prove that a defendant had intent to commit a crime at the time of entry, but also that the entry be ‘without authority.’”⁹ Nevertheless, he contends that Illinois courts have “effectively ... collapsed” the “without authority” element with the “intent to commit a crime” element with the result that “the State need not prove unlawful presence apart from proof of the defendant’s intent.”¹⁰ This interpretation has its origins in *People v. Weaver*, 243 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ill. 1968).

In *Weaver*, the defendant had entered a laundromat with the intent to steal coins from the vending machines inside.

⁸ Mr. Glispie acknowledges that this was the language of the residential burglary statute at all times relevant to his underlying convictions. See Appellant’s Br. 13.

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.* at 18 (emphasis removed) (quoting *People v. Rudd*, 970 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)).

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He was charged and convicted under the Illinois burglary statute.¹¹ On appeal, he argued that, because the laundromat was open to the public at the time in question, “he could have entered as a business invitee,” and, therefore, his entry “in the store [wa]s as consistent with his innocence as with his guilt.” *Weaver*, 243 N.E.2d at 248. The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected this argument:

While a common-law breaking is no longer an essential element of the crime of burglary, the statute requires an entry which is both without authority and with intent to commit a felony or theft. A criminal intent formulated after a lawful entry will not satisfy the statute. But authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open. An entry with intent to commit a theft cannot be said to be within the authority granted patrons of a laundromat.

Id. (citations omitted). *Weaver* thus established that one who enters a public building with the intent to commit a crime

¹¹ The Illinois burglary statute provides, in relevant part: “A person commits burglary when without authority he or she knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft. This offense shall not include the offenses set out in Section 4-102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.” 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a).

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automatically satisfies the unlawful entry requirement of the Illinois burglary statute.

Since *Weaver*, the Supreme Court of Illinois and Appellate Court of Illinois consistently have applied this principle—the limited-authority doctrine—to burglary of public establishments.¹² See *People v. Blair*, 288 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ill.

¹² The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, has held that the limited-authority doctrine does not apply to burglary by remaining. See *People v. Bradford*, 50 N.E.3d 1112 (Ill. 2016). In *Bradford*, the defendant had been convicted of burglary under 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) for “knowingly and without authority remain[ing] within the building of Walmart, with the intent to commit therein a felony or a theft.” *Id.* at 1113–14 (alterations in original). Before the Supreme Court of Illinois, he argued that he had not satisfied the elements of the crime because

he never exceeded the scope of his physical authority to be in the Walmart. He contend[ed] that burglary by remaining is not intended to apply to ordinary shoplifting. Rather, it refers to situations in which a person lawfully enters a place of business, but, in order to commit a theft or felony: (1) hides and waits for the building to close; (2) enters an unauthorized area within the building; or (3) continues to remain on the premises after being asked to leave. Since defendant lawfully entered the Walmart during regular business hours, shoplifted merchandise within public areas of the store, and left while the store was still open, defendant argues that he committed retail theft, ... rather than burglary

Id. at 1117. On the authority of *People v. Weaver*, 243 N.E.2d 245 (Ill. 1968), however, the State maintained “that an individual who engages in a ‘discrete act of remaining’ within a store with the intent to commit a theft is guilty of burglary by remaining.” *Bradford*, 50 N.E.3d at 1117. The state supreme court, however, rejected this contention. The court explained that “it [wa]s not clear what evidence would be sufficient to establish

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1972) (quoting *Weaver*, 243 N.E.2d at 248, for the proposition that “authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open”); see also *People v. Rudd*, 970 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (explaining that, “in the context of a building open to the public, ... the permission to enter does not extend to people who enter for purposes that are inconsistent with the purpose for which the building is open to the public,” and, therefore,

(... continued)

that a defendant ‘remains’ within a public place in order to commit a theft.” *Id.* at 1118. Extending the doctrine to “remaining-in” burglary also would “arbitrarily distinguish[] between a defendant who shoplifts one item in a store and leaves immediately afterwards and a defendant who shoplifts more than one item or lingers inside a store before leaving.” *Id.* Consequently, the court concluded that “burglary by remaining includes situations in which an individual enters a public building lawfully, but, in order to commit a theft or felony, (1) hides and waits for the building to close, (2) enters unauthorized areas within the building, or (3) continues to remain on the premises after his authority is explicitly revoked.” *Id.* at 1120 (citations omitted).

After *Bradford*, one state appellate court interpreted that decision to eliminate the limited-authority doctrine for unlawful-entry burglary as well as remaining-in burglary, “effectively overrul[ing]” *Weaver* and its progeny. See *People v. Johnson*, 94 N.E.3d 289, 294 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). However, in *People v. Johnson*, No. 123318, 2019 WL 3559640, at *11 (Ill. Aug. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court’s decision and reaffirmed *Weaver*. See *infra* pp. 16–17 (discussing the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in *Johnson*). In *Johnson*, 2019 WL 3559640, at *5, the Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly noted that “none of the concerns expressed in *Bradford* apply to burglary involving an unauthorized entry based on the intent to commit retail theft.” See also *infra* pp.16–17.

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“the State need not prove unlawful presence apart from proof of the defendant’s intent”); *People v. Smith*, 637 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (observing that “under Illinois law a burglary can occur during business hours in a building open to the public” and that such convictions must rest upon evidence “sufficient to show an intent to commit a felony or theft at the time of entry onto the premises of the business establishment”), *remanded on other grounds*, 643 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. 1994). Most recently, in *People v. Johnson*, No. 123318, 2019 WL 3559640 (Ill. Aug. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of Illinois reaffirmed *Weaver*; it stated:

Weaver construed the current burglary statute over 50 years ago (and 7 years after it was enacted) as granting a patron of a building open to the public only limited authority to enter the establishment for a “purpose consistent with the reason the building is open.” *Weaver*, 243 N.E.2d [at 248]. And “[a]n entry with intent to commit a theft cannot be said to be within the authority granted patrons.” *Id.* The appellate court has consistently, and quite correctly, applied this holding to open retail shops. And while the General Assembly has amended the burglary statute a number of times in the half-century since *Weaver* was decided, it has never acted to reverse *Weaver* and its progeny’s interpretation of the statute. When the legislature does not address by way of amendment a judicial construction of a statute by this court, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation and such a con-

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struction becomes as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it.

Johnson, 2019 WL 3559640, at *7 (citations and parallel citations omitted).

The Supreme Court of Illinois also has held that the limited-authority doctrine applies to the Illinois home-invasion statute, which, like the residential burglary statute, has as an element that the defendant “without authority ... knowingly enter[] the dwelling place of another.” 720 ILCS 5/19-6. Specifically, in *People v. Bush*, 623 N.E.2d 1361, 1364 (Ill. 1993), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:

In [*People v.]Peeples*, [616 N.E.2d 294 (Ill. 1993),] this court stated that when a defendant comes to a private residence and is invited in by the occupant, the authorization to enter is limited and that criminal actions exceed this limited authority. No individual who is granted access to a dwelling can be said to be an authorized entrant if he intends to commit criminal acts therein, because, if such intentions had been communicated to the owner at the time of entry, it would have resulted in the individual’s being barred from the premises *ab initio*. Thus, the determination of whether an entry is unauthorized depends upon whether the defendant possessed the intent to perform a criminal act therein at the time entry was granted. If, as in *Peeples*, the defendant gains access to the victim’s residence through trickery and deceit and with the intent to commit criminal acts, his entry is unauthorized and the consent given viti-

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ated because the true purpose for the entry exceeded the limited authorization granted. Conversely, where the defendant enters with an innocent intent, his entry is authorized, and criminal actions thereafter engaged in by the defendant do not change the status of the entry.

Bush, 623 N.E.2d at 1364 (citations omitted).

Although the Supreme Court of Illinois has applied this doctrine consistently to entry of public buildings under the burglary statute and to entry of dwellings under the home-invasion statute, it never has addressed whether the doctrine applies to entry of dwellings under the *residential* burglary statute, the statute under which Mr. Glispie was convicted. The issue was raised in *People v. Wilson*, 614 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. 1993), but the Supreme Court of Illinois neither reached nor resolved the issue, *see id.* at 1231.

The majority of Illinois Appellate Courts,¹³ however, *have extended* this doctrine to the residential burglary statute. *See, e.g., People v. Walker*, 547 N.E.2d 1036, 1038–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (noting that the defendants were permitted into the victim’s home for a specific purpose, but that the evidence “established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Caruth

¹³ The Government argues that decisions from the Supreme Court of Illinois are the only authoritative source for determining the meaning of a state statute. *See Gov’t’s Br. 17*. Although it is true that only state supreme court cases bind this court, state appellate court decisions nevertheless provide significant guidance. Indeed, in *Smith*, 877 F.3d at 723, we relied on an Illinois Appellate Court opinion to determine the “dwelling” requirement of the Illinois residential burglary statute.

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brothers entered with the intent to commit a robbery and that such entry was unauthorized"); *People v. Fisher*, 404 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (applying doctrine to burglary of an apartment); *see also, e.g., People v. Hodge*, No. 5-11-0082, 2012 WL 7070081, at *4 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 3, 2012) (unpublished) ("[A]ssuming *arguendo* that the State did not meet its burden of proof regarding the defendant's authority to enter the home, this court nevertheless agrees with the State that the defendant would have forfeited such authority under the 'limited authority' doctrine" because the defendant "had intent to perform a criminal act at the time entry was granted.").¹⁴

Despite these authorities, the Government maintains that there is little indication that the Supreme Court of Illinois

¹⁴ Mr. Glispie notes that the second district appellate court is the lone holdout for requiring "separate proof of unauthorized entry, apart from a contemporaneous intent to commit a theft or felony." Reply Br. 13. He submits, however, that given that appellate court's decision in *People v. Dillavou*, 958 N.E.2d 1118, 1121–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), it "appears to have fallen in line with its sister districts." Reply Br. 13. In *Dillavou*, however, the defendant was not convicted of residential burglary based on entering without authority; "[r]ather, defendant was convicted under the second part of the residential burglary statute": "'knowingly and without authority remain[ing] within'" the victim's home. 958 N.E.2d at 1121 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). Thus, *Dillavou* did not address the critical issue—whether the first prong of the burglary statute requires "separate proof of unauthorized entry, apart from a contemporaneous intent to commit a theft or felony." Indeed, in *Dillavou*, the court did not even reach the question whether "the limited-authority doctrine applies to defendants charged with residential burglary by remaining without authority." *Id.* at 1123. *Dillavou*, therefore, does not convince us that the second district appellate court has altered its course.

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would agree with the appellate courts that the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary. First, it notes that the Supreme Court of Illinois “expressly declined to consider” the issue in *Wilson*, 614 N.E.2d at 1231.¹⁵ The Government, however, has not come forward with any authority suggesting that the court’s action in *Wilson*—postponing resolution of an issue until it is necessary for disposition of a case before it—is evidence that the Supreme Court of Illinois would be unwilling, in the appropriate case, to extend the limited-authority doctrine to residential burglary. Second, the Government contends that the state supreme court’s discussion in *Johnson* “emphasized that its rationale and holding were restricted to the commercial context.”¹⁶ This is not surprising, however, because *Johnson* involved a conviction for burglary of a department store. The court had neither the opportunity, nor any reason, to speak in broader terms. Third, the Government submits that there are “essential differences between commercial establishments and residences, in relation to the presence of other persons, [that] militate against any assumption that the state supreme court would apply the limited-authority doctrine to residential burglary.”¹⁷ This argument would have more force if the Supreme Court of Illinois had not applied the doctrine to the home-invasion statute. As the Supreme Court of Illinois already has extended the doctrine to home invasion, however, it is unlikely that it would be persuaded by a

¹⁵ Gov’t’s Br. 14.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 27.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 28.

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commercial-residential distinction. Moreover, in *Bush*, the Supreme Court of Illinois relied in part on *People v. Hudson*, 448 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983), for the proposition that the “interpretation of language ‘without authority’ in [the] home invasion statute should be consistent with [the] meaning given [the] same language in [the] burglary statute.” *Bush*, 623 N.E.2d at 1364. By extension, the “without authority” language in the residential burglary statute¹⁸ should be given the same meaning as that of the burglary and home-invasion statutes.¹⁹

¹⁸ See *supra* p.12 (setting forth the language of the residential burglary statute).

¹⁹ The Government also argues that extending the limited-authority doctrine to residential burglary would render subsection (a-5) of that statute superfluous. See Gov’t’s Br. 30. Subsection (a-5), added to the statute in 2010, provides that “[a] person commits residential burglary when he or she falsely represents himself or herself ... for purpose of gaining entry to the dwelling place of another, with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft or to facilitate the commission therein of a felony or theft by another.” 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a-5) (emphasis added). The Government maintains that “[a]pplying the limited-authority doctrine to residential burglary, and thus permitting courts to infer unauthorized entry or remaining merely from the burglar’s intent, would essentially eliminate the separate element of unauthorized entry or remaining from cases under subsection (a), rendering subsection (a-5) unnecessary.” Gov’t’s Br. 30–31. If the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary, there may be *some* overlap between subsections (a) and (a-5); nevertheless subsection (a-5) still would encompass situations that subsection (a) would not. An individual violates subsection (a-5) when his entry of a dwelling is either with “intent to commit therein a felony or theft,” or “with the intent ... to facilitate the commission therein of a felony or theft by another.” Subsection (a-5) therefore encompasses individuals who have no
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Thus, the weight of Illinois cases, as well as principles of statutory interpretation, suggest that the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary, just as it does to burglary and to home invasion. If that is the case, and proof of “intent to commit ... a felony or theft” also satisfies the element of entering “without authority,” then Illinois residential burglary is broader than generic burglary under the ACCA²⁰ and cannot be used as a predicate offense for an increased sentence under the ACCA.

II.

Given the frequency with which this issue arises, the possible impact of its resolution on Illinois citizens, and the importance of this issue in the application of the ACCA in this circuit, we believe the appropriate course of action is to certify this controlling issue of law to the Supreme Court of Illinois. The principle impediment to our pursuing this course is our prior decision of *Dawkins v. United States*, 809 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016), which addressed the scope of entering “without authority” under the Illinois burglary statutes. The Government maintains that *Dawkins* controls the issue before us and should not be reconsidered. Mr. Glispie maintains that, in light of both the strong evidence that Illinois recognizes the limited-authority doctrine and our failure to consider that doctrine in *Dawkins*, we must revisit that decision.

(... continued)

intent to commit a crime themselves, but are “casing” the dwelling for another individual.

²⁰ See *supra* p.10.

In *Dawkins*, the petitioner had pleaded guilty to armed robbery and had been sentenced as a career offender under the ACCA on the basis of his prior carjacking and Illinois burglary convictions. Following his sentence, he sought permission to file a successive habeas petition on the basis of *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that the ACCA's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.²¹ Dawkins maintained that burglary under Illinois law was broader than generic burglary; specifically, he submitted that Illinois required only an "entry without authority" which was broader than the "unlawful entry" required for generic burglary. *Dawkins*, 809 F.3d at 955. Because his Illinois burglary conviction was not encompassed by one of the specifically enumerated offenses in the ACCA, Dawkins continued, the now unconstitutional "residual clause" had to serve as the basis for designating his burglary as a violent felony under the ACCA. He therefore contended that he was sentenced under an unconstitutional statute and should have been granted permission to pursue habeas relief on that basis.

A divided panel of our court denied relief.²² The majority held that Dawkins's petition did not implicate *Johnson* because Illinois burglary was not broader than generic burglary under the ACCA. The majority held that the elements of residential burglary under Illinois law were indistinguishable from the generic understanding of burglary: "Illinois

²¹ See *supra* note 2.

²² Dawkins's petition was submitted to the panel on the briefs, without the benefit of oral argument.

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courts, like federal courts, use terms like unlawfully, unauthorized, without consent and without authority interchangeably[.]” *Id.* (collecting cases). Because Illinois burglary and generic burglary are materially indistinguishable, the sentencing court did not need to resort to the residual clause of the ACCA “to determine that Dawkins’ prior conviction for burglary was a conviction for a crime of violence, for it was a conviction for ‘burglary’ as defined by the Supreme Court in the *Taylor* decision.” *Id.* at 956.

The dissent believed, however, that the majority decision failed to undertake the elemental analysis required by the categorical approach. The dissent explained that *Descamps* required that, for a state burglary conviction to qualify as generic burglary, it must require “the ‘element of breaking and entering or similar unlawful conduct.’” *Id.* at 957 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (quoting *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 276). In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Descamps*, the dissent perceived “two significant problems” in Dawkins’s application for collateral relief that needed to be “examined by the district court in more detail.” *Id.* First, it was unclear which Illinois burglary statute formed the basis for Dawkins’s conviction—the burglary statute or the residential burglary statute. Second, neither statute had as an element “breaking and entering,” *id.*, and, indeed, the Supreme Court of Illinois had held that “a common-law breaking is no longer an essential element of the crime of burglary,” *id.* at 958 (quoting *Weaver*, 243 N.E.2d at 248). In light of the language used in *Descamps*, the dissent believed that it was nec-

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essary to reassess our prior assumption that Illinois burglary qualified as generic burglary under the ACCA.²³

We agree with Mr. Glispie that our reasoning in *Dawkins* does not reflect the elemental analysis required by the categorical approach. Our consideration of the scope of the un-

²³ *Smith*, 877 F.3d 720, also addressed the issue whether a residential burglary in Illinois qualified as generic burglary for purposes of the ACCA. In *Smith*, the district courts had read *Dawkins* “as conclusively establishing that residential burglary in Illinois satisfies *Taylor*.” *Id.* at 722. We concluded otherwise: “[T]he only question addressed in *Dawkins* was whether residential burglary in Illinois includes the element of breaking and entering; we answered yes.” *Id.* We went on to consider whether the Illinois offense includes as an element “entering a ‘building or other structure’” as required by *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 598. The defendants had argued that, because Illinois residential burglary requires entry of a “dwelling place of another,” and dwelling place is defined as “a house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters,” the Illinois statute is broader than the generic offense. *Smith*, 877 F.3d at 722–23 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) and 720 ILCS 5/2-6(b), respectively). We rejected that argument. We explained that *Taylor* “set out to create a federal common-law definition of ‘burglary’” and therefore “counsel[ed] against reading its definition as if it were a statute.” *Id.* at 723. In *Taylor*, we continued, the Court was attempting to get to a common understanding of burglary. By the time *Taylor* was handed down, most states had amended their burglary statutes to cover trailers and mobile homes. We thought “it unlikely that the Justices set out in *Taylor* to adopt a definition of generic burglary that is satisfied by no more than a handful of states—if by any.” *Id.* at 724. We concluded that “[p]eople live in trailers, which are ‘structures’ as a matter of ordinary usage. Trailers used as dwellings are covered by the Illinois residential-burglary statute. The crime in 720 ILCS 5/19-3 therefore is ‘burglary’ under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Defendants were properly sentenced as armed career criminals.” *Id.* at 725. *Smith*, therefore, did not rely, or build directly, upon our holding in *Dawkins*.

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authorized entry requirement began and ended with the observation that “Illinois courts, like federal courts, use terms like unlawfully, unauthorized, without consent, and without authority interchangeably[.]” *Dawkins*, 809 F.3d at 955. This would be persuasive reasoning if the cases on which we rested our analysis actually had considered the underlying meanings of those terms. The bulk of the cases, however, contained no such analysis; indeed, most compared other elements of generic and statutory burglary or focused on a different issue altogether. *See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Flores*, 743 F.3d 816, 822–23 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that, given the lack of case law interpreting the South Carolina burglary statute, it was not plain error for the court to consider the statute divisible, and, applying the modified categorical approach, the district court did not err in concluding that the burglary conviction involved entry into the victim’s residence); *United States v. Constantine*, 674 F.3d 985, 990 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting defendant’s argument that “burglary” under the ACCA should be limited to residential burglary), *abrogated on other grounds by United States v. McArthur*, 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017); *United States v. Bonilla*, 687 F.3d 188, 192–93 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that, where defendant had conceded that “all of the *Taylor* elements—unlawful entry, of a building or other structure, and the requisite intent to commit a felony”—were satisfied, the fact that, under Texas law, the intent to commit a felony could be formulated before or after the unlawful entry did not take it outside of generic burglary).

The two cases on which we relied in *Dawkins* and that did address the scope of “unauthorized” and “unlawful” entries raise serious questions about the validity of our analytical approach in *Dawkins* and suggest that we need to consid-

er carefully Mr. Glispie's submission. In *United States v. Tighe*, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001), the defendant had argued that a prior conviction for burglary under South Dakota law did not qualify as generic burglary because the statute "omits any reference to the required entry being unlawful or unprivileged." *Id.* at 1196. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that there was "no mention of the lawfulness of the entry" in the text of the statute and that it therefore appeared that the statute fell outside the generic definition of burglary. *Id.* It noted, however, that the Supreme Court of South Dakota had interpreted the statute to include "the element of 'unlawful or unauthorized entry,'" separate from the element of intent, which brought it within the generic definition. *Id.* Similarly, in *United States v. Lujan*, 9 F.3d 890 (10th Cir. 1993), the defendant had argued that an "unauthorized entry" required for his New Mexico burglary conviction could "mean anything and d[id] not necessarily rise to the level of unlawful or unprivileged entry" required for generic burglary. *Id.* at 892. The Tenth Circuit noted that, in *Taylor*, the Court had relied on the Model Penal Code definition of burglary, which reads: "A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, *unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.*" *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Under New Mexico law, however, a person was not guilty of burglary if he merely "enter[ed] a store open to the public with intent to ... commit larceny." *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus," the court concluded, "'unauthorized entry' as used in the New Mexico burglary statute and in Mr. Lujan's indictment necessarily

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ha[d] the same meaning as ‘unlawful or unprivileged entry’ in *Taylor*[.]’ *Id.*

In sum, when issues concerning the scope of “unlawful or unprivileged entry” were raised in these cases, the courts critically assessed the scope of the relevant state law before determining that the generic element was satisfied. *Dawkins* does not contain the rigorous elemental analysis found in these two cases. We are confident, moreover, that had we undertaken that same critical analysis in *Dawkins* as our sister circuits did in *Tighe* and *Lujan*, we would have ended up where we are today: facing the critical question whether, under Illinois law, the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary, effectively collapsing the “unauthorized entry” and “intent to commit ... a felony” requirements, and taking it outside of the definition of generic burglary.

As we have noted, we believe that Illinois case law, as well as its principles of statutory interpretation, generally point to the conclusion that the Supreme Court of Illinois would apply the limited-authority doctrine to the residential burglary statute. However, Illinois appellate courts have not been unanimous in their extension of this doctrine to residential burglary,²⁴ and application of the doctrine may affect the interpretation of other sections of the Illinois residential-burglary and home-invasion statutes.²⁵ “Certification of a controlling issue of state law to the highest court of the state is one method of reducing the possibility of error” in trying to predict what course the state supreme court might choose.

²⁴ See *supra* note 14.

²⁵ See *supra* note 19.

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See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 2002).

Circuit Rule 52 provides that

[w]hen the rules of the highest court of a state provide for certification to that court by a federal court of questions arising under the laws of that state which will control the outcome of a case pending in the federal court, this court, sua sponte or on motion of a party, may certify such a question to the state court in accordance with the rules of that court, and may stay the case in this court to await the state court's decision of the question certified.

Certification to the Supreme Court of Illinois is proper when "there are involved in any proceeding before [the Seventh Circuit] questions as to the law of this State, which may be determinative of the said cause, and there are no controlling precedents in the decisions of this court." Ill. S. Ct. R. 20(a). Here, the question whether the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary will determine whether the district court erred in sentencing Mr. Glispie as a career offender. No controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Illinois answers this question. We therefore respectfully ask the Supreme Court of Illinois to answer the question whether, and if so under what circumstances, the limited-authority doctrine applies to its residential burglary statute, 720 ILCS 5/19-3.

The Clerk of this Court will transmit the briefs and appendices in this case, together with this opinion, to the Supreme Court of Illinois. On the request of that Court, the

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Clerk will transmit all or any part of the record as that Court so desires.

QUESTION CERTIFIED

No. 125483

In the
Supreme Court of Illinois

United States of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

Jeremy Glispie,
Defendant-Appellant.

On order agreeing to answer question certified by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
No. 19-1224

Notice of filing and proof of service

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-109, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct. The undersigned counsel of record hereby certifies that on that, on January 30, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court using the Odyssey eFileIL system, which will send notification of such filing to counsel of record:

E-FILED
1/30/2020 4:35 PM
Carolyn Taft Grosboll
SUPREME COURT CLERK

W. Scott Simpson, Assistant United States Attorney, 318 South Sixth Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701; w.scott.simpson@usdoj.gov

The undersigned also certifies that she has mailed a paper copy of this brief to Mr. Jeremy Glispie at the following address on January 30, 2020:

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